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Abstract
This paper considers the performance of banks, domestic and foreign, in Korea
prior to, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis, examining how
the profitability of those banks differed and identifying factors that explain why
those differences existed. The performance of Korean banks deteriorated dramat-
ically in 1998 with most banks recovering somewhat in 1999. Foreign banks did
not experience the same negative effect on their returns on assets and equity as a
rule. Several standard findings emerge. For example, equity to assets correlates
positively with domestic, but not foreign, bank performance, as measured by the
returns on assets and equity, even when the government recapitalized institutions
that were performing quite badly. Also, foreign-currency deposits significantly
and negatively correlate with domestic Korean bank performance, although only
in the post-crisis period for regional banks. In sum, the domestic Korean banks
suffered more severely from the Asian financial crisis than foreign banks.
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I. Introduction: 
The world’s economy experienced several financial crises in the last decade – for example, the 
1994 Mexican peso collapse and the resulting turmoil in Latin America, and the 1997-98 Asian 
crisis.1 The devaluation of the Thai baht initiated the Asian financial crisis on July 2, 1997 that 
quickly spread to a number of Asian countries. The effects of the crisis on countries differed with 
some countries experiencing severe economic contractions while others saw modest effects on 
their domestic economies.2  
 Our paper focuses on the performance of nationwide (national) and regional Korean 
banks as well as foreign banks (bank offices) prior to, during, and immediately after the Asian 
financial crisis.3 We examine how the profitability of these banks differed and identify factors 
that explain why these differences existed. Our paper also adds significant value in two areas. 
First, we assemble probably the best panel data set on Korean domestic – nationwide and 
regional – and foreign banks during the mid and late 1990s. Second, we capitalize on that panel 
data structure and employ the fixed-effect regression technique. 
 Various analysts suggest that foreign bank lending played a unique role in the Asian 
financial crisis vis-à-vis other similar events (Cho and Hong 2001, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001, 
and Tornell 2001). Domestic banks supplied major quantities of credit to domestic firms. 
Domestic banks also came to rely more heavily on foreign bank lending. When the crisis reared 
 
1 Ito and Krueger (2001) recently edited a series of papers that examine the causes and consequences of the Asian 
financial crisis with comparisons to similar prior crises. 
2 Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001), for example, argue that Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan did not suffer 
as much as other countries because of trade and current account surpluses, significant holdings of foreign exchange 
reserves, and the relative absence of “crony capitalism.” Other discussions of financial crises include Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2001), Tornell (2001), and Hahm and Mishkin (2000) 
3 Jeon and Miller (2002) provide an analysis of Korean nationwide banks with a slightly longer time frame and a 
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its ugly head, the supply of foreign lending evaporated quickly, confronting the domestic banks 
with a liquidity crisis. Moreover, some commentators indict the initial International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) rescue programs as worsening the liquidity crisis by requiring tighter credit (Radelet 
and Sachs 1998). 
 Noland (2000) differentiates the Korean crisis from other Southeast Asian crises, since 
the Korean investment boom occurred in the manufacturing sector, especially the chaebols, 
rather than in real estate and since investment growth was funded in large part by short-run 
capital inflows. That is, short-term capital controls were liberalized while the long-term controls 
were not.4 In short, the financial crisis caused some important corporate borrowers to default on 
their loans to banks. That negative shock was reinforced and compounded by the loss of foreign 
lending to domestic banks. Impending bank failures necessitated the intervention by the central 
bank to assist in finding merger partners (possibly foreign) or to take over operations of the 
failed banks itself. 
 Our analysis supports several conclusions. The performance of Korean banks 
deteriorated dramatically in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999. Foreign banks did 
not experience the same negative effect on their returns on assets and equity as a rule. Several 
standard findings emerge. First, equity to assets correlates positively with domestic, but not 
foreign, bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of institutions that 
were performing quite badly. Second, provisions for loan losses generally correlates negatively 
 
richer set of balance sheet and income statement data. 
4 Noland also argues that the initial IMF program exacerbated problems by confusing the Asian financial crisis with 
the earlier Latin American crisis. The Asian crisis differed according to Noland, because the corporate expansion 
was loan, not equity, based. Thus, the financial crisis raised interest rates, triggering a liquidity crisis. The IMF’s 
prescription to tighten credit worsened the liquidity crisis. 
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with bank performance. Finally, decreases in foreign-currency deposits significantly and 
negatively correlate with domestic Korean bank performance as measured by the returns on 
assets and equity. 
II. Foreign Banks: A Blessing or A Curse in Domestic Financial Markets 
The Asian financial crisis underscores the importance of strong, stable financial markets for the 
maintenance of economic development, since weak, unstable financial markets can push an 
economy to its knees. In this regard, some analysts argue that foreign bank participation in 
domestic financial markets strengthens the domestic economy. Other analysts argue that the 
financial service industry possesses public good characteristics and that the unfettered private 
interests (markets), especially interests with foreign connections, should not control credit 
allocation decisions. That view, at a minimum, implies that foreign banks should not operate in 
the domestic economy. An even more stringent view argues that state ownership and state-
mandated credit allocation needs to send credit to those sectors most crucial for economic 
development. 
 Korea transversed the spectrum from a system with large elements of state ownership and 
state-directed credit flows to a more open and competitive financial markets with a significant 
presence of foreign banks. And a large privatization of state-owned banks has occurred since 
Korea decided to travel down the path of deregulation. 
 Proponents of foreign bank entry make several arguments (e.g., Claessens, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Huizinga 2001, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min 1998, Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney 
2000, and Levin 1996). First, foreign banks provide the channel through which capital inflows 
finance domestic activities. To the extent that such funding adds to, rather than substitutes for, 
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domestic funding, it will stimulate the domestic economy, at least one that experiences a 
shortage of available funding from domestic sources. Second, the increased competition among 
banks – domestic and foreign –- will improve the performance of banks and provide financial 
services at a lower average cost. Finally, the experience of foreign banks in their home country 
may lead to better regulation and supervision in the foreign markets where they do business. 
 Opponents of foreign bank entry also make several arguments (e.g., Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001, and Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min 1998). First, unlike 
the optimists, the pessimists see the capital flow channel as a path for capital flight when the 
“going gets tough”. That is, the pessimists place a much higher weight on the negative 
consequences of capital outflows during bad times than on the positive consequences of capital 
inflows during good times. Second, foreign banks may have a competitive advantage that allows 
them to “cherry” pick among the available domestic funding options, choosing the more-
profitable, low-risk options and leaving the less-profitable, higher-risk options for domestic 
institutions. Third, foreign banks from developed countries may introduce complexities not seen 
by domestic regulators and supervisors, worsening, rather than improving, the regulatory and 
supervisory process. 
 The movement in recent decades toward more-open financial markets and the increased 
activity of foreign banks in domestic financial markets suggests that the proponents have 
currently won the day. The Asian financial crisis raises the issue of the role, if any, of foreign 
banks in creating or continuing the crisis. 
 Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) note a conundrum in understanding 
foreign bank operations. To wit, foreign banks that operate in developing countries generally 
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achieve higher profitability than domestic banks;5 the opposite occurs in developed countries. 
They first articulate the popular explanation: banks from developed countries follow domestic 
customers into foreign markets, even when the profitability is lower.6 They then offer several 
rationalizations for the differences between the profitability of foreign banks in developed and 
developing countries. First, low net-interest margins in developed countries may reflect 
participation in wholesale, rather than retail, markets with smaller net-interest margins. Second, 
the technical advantages for foreign banks in developed countries may be too small to cover 
informational disadvantages. Of course, those two explanations of low net-interest margins may 
reverse themselves in developing countries. That is, foreign banks may enter retail markets more 
fully in developing countries and/or they may possess higher levels of technical efficiency that 
overcomes any informational disadvantages.7 
 Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) examine foreign bank operations in 80 
countries. They conclude that foreign banks experience lower net-interest margins, overhead 
expenses, and profitabilities than domestic banks in developed countries.8 The opposite ranking 
emerges in developing countries. They also consider how the operation of foreign banks may 
affect the performance of domestic banks as well as how the performance of domestic banks may 
 
5 The Korean experience matches that observation over the 1994 to 1999 period. See Table 1 below. 
6 Nolle and Seth (1996), however, examining the experience of U.S. banks operating in 6 developed countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the U.K.), conclude that “ … the ‘follow the customer’ 
hypothesis may have more limited applicability … than previously supposed.” (p. 2). DeYoung and Nolle (1996) 
argue that lower profitability of foreign banks in the U.S. reflects a preference for growth over profits. 
7 On this point, see our discussion of Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2001) at the end of this section. 
8 Terrell (1986) reports similar findings. 
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attract foreign banks. They conclude that the expansion of the foreign bank presence associates 
with a lower profitability and a higher provisioning for bad loans by domestic banks.9 
 Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2001) explore this conundrum from a slightly 
different point of view. They consider two alternative hypotheses that can explain differences in 
foreign and domestic bank performance – the home-field- and global-advantage hypotheses. The 
home-field-advantage hypothesis argues that domestic banks generally outperform foreign banks 
because of informational and cost advantages. The global-advantage hypothesis argues that 
banks from some countries possess sufficient efficiency gains, allowing them to overcome any 
home-field advantages accruing to domestic banks. They examine the X-efficiency of domestic 
and foreign banks within the borders of a given country. They calculate X-efficiency in five 
developed (OECD) countries – France, Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. Moreover, the 
foreign banks also come from developed (OECD) countries, except for Korea. They conclude 
that domestic banks exhibit higher cost- and profit-efficiencies than foreign banks, supporting 
the home-field-advantage hypothesis. Decomposing the foreign banks by country of origin 
provides some support for the global-advantage hypothesis. That is, foreign banks from the U.S. 
generally exceed the cost- and profit-efficiencies of domestic banks.10 
 The empirical observation that foreign banks perform better than domestic banks in 
developing countries implies that the technical savvy of banks from developed countries 
 
9 Amel and Liang (1997) describe similar results. 
10 Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min (1998) employ the same data as Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001) and draw three conclusions concerning the effects of foreign bank operations on the domestic economy. 
Greater participation by foreign banks tends to (1) reduce the probability of a banking crisis, (2) improve the 
efficiency of domestic banks, and (3) boost indirectly economic growth by improving domestic bank efficiency. 
Further, the effects of foreign bank operations relate to the number of foreign banks and not the size of their 
operations. 
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generally overcomes the home-field-advantage in developing countries, especially when the 
domestic economy has relatively unsophisticated financial markets and institutions. Of course, 
that conjecture only makes sense in those countries where financial markets allow the entry of 
foreign banks. 
III. Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis 
Our balance sheet and income statement data for nationwide and regional Korean banks and 
foreign banks come from Bank Management Statistics, published by the Financial Supervisory 
Services (1999, 2000). Sixteen nationwide and 10 regional banks and 59 foreign banks enter our 
database for at least one year in the sample from 1994 through 1999.11 Several bank entrances, 
mergers, acquisitions, and conversions occurred over the sample period, as the Asian financial 
crisis threw a roadblock across the path of deregulation and privatization of the financial sector 
begun by the Korean government and the Bank of Korea in the early 1980s.12  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, major components of the Korean financial system were 
nationalized. Lending was targeted toward favored sectors (and firms), such as exports and 
heavy industries (Bank of Korea 1994). Moreover, regional banks, which could operate only in 
their own provinces (and a branch in Seoul), entered the scene in 1967 to encourage regionally 
based development.13 Plans to deregulate the financial system and place Korean commercial 
banks in the private sector began in the early 1980s. 
 
11 See the appendix for the banks and country of origin in the sample. 
12 Bank of Korea (1994) and Gilbert and Wilson (1998) provide information on the Korean financial system. 
13 Over 1980 to 1994, Gilbert and Wilson (1998) calculate that nationwide banks experienced significant, large 
productivity improvement while regional banks experienced mixed results. 
  9
                                                
 Deregulation in the early 1980s expanded the power of commercial banks, who could 
now, for example, offer credit cards, issue negotiable certificates of deposit, provide automated 
teller machines, and so on (Gilbert and Wilson 1998). Simultaneously, foreign exchange controls 
and restrictions on foreign ownership of Korean assets eased. The government’s hand still 
wielded, nonetheless, a potent force, controlling interest rates on certain types of loans and 
deposits. Further, the government’s informal credit policy continued to favor selected sectors. 
 Gilbert and Wilson (1998) argue that the Korean commercial banking system 
experienced a crisis in the mid-1980s with significant levels of bad loans. No Korean bank failed 
at this time, however, as charge-off rates for bad loans were allocated slowly enough to maintain 
individual bank viability. No such luck (skill) graced the Korean commercial banking industry 
during the Asian financial crisis. 
 While the Asian financial crisis produced the dramatic domestic economic crisis in 
Korea, more fundamental causes also added to its severity.14 The corporate sector overextended 
itself with too much investment and borrowing. Commercial banks overused short-term foreign 
lending as a source of funds. Finally, the lack of transparency of balance sheets, income 
statements, and management practices all led to a crisis of confidence in Korean institutions. In 
sum, the Korean economy was an “accident waiting to happen.” 
 Korea First and Seoul became insolvent during the Asian financial crisis. They were 
judged as “too-big-to-fail” institutions. Thus, the government nationalized and recapitalized 
them in January 1998. The Bank of Korea sought private (foreign) buyers for both banks after 
 
14 The next few paragraphs rely on information from Bank of Korea (1998). 
  10
                                                
recapitalization. After protracted negotiations, Newbridge Capital acquired Korea First in 
December 1999. Seoul still sits on the auction block. 
 Having determined that Korea First and Seoul were too-big-to-fail, the Monetary Board 
of the Bank of Korea in February 1998 identified 12 of the remaining 24 Korean banks as falling 
below the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy requirement of 8 percent. 
After examining the financial conditions of those twelve banks, the Financial Supervisory 
Commission ordered the closure of 5 Korean banks – 3 nationwide and 2 regional – since they 
were judged to have little chance of recovering. Those banks were closed through purchase and 
assumptions (P&As) where the acquiring banks assumed the liabilities and purchased only the 
“sound” assets. 
 Chase Manhattan entered the Korean economy as the first foreign bank in 1967.15 The 
participation of foreign banks grew at a good pace through out the 1970s and 1980s, but 
stabilized in the 1990s and then fell somewhat after the Asian financial crisis. Foreign banks 
came to Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, partly because they received more favorable 
treatment in certain areas than domestic banks. In the mid-1980s, regulatory change began eating 
away at the preferential treatment of foreign banks. But along with the elimination of preferential 
treatment in some areas, other regulatory changes reduced barriers and restrictions on foreign 
bank activities. Thus, the playing field was basically leveled between foreign and domestic 
banks. 
 Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min (1998) argue that the foreign bank presence in Korea 
provided positive, competitive pressure on domestic banks through the end of their sample in 
 
15 The discussion in this paragraph relies on Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min (1998). 
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1996, just prior to the Asian financial crisis. They attribute the better foreign bank performance 
to more economical labor use and better underwriting of loans. That is, foreign banks possessed 
much higher ratios of profit to employee, loans to employee, and expenses to employee and 
much lower ratio of non-performing loans to loans than domestic banks (Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, 
and Min, 1998, Table 10, p. 102). 
 From 1994 through 1999, 59 foreign banks operated in Korea – some for the full sample 
period, others for only parts. The 59 banks include 14 each from the U.S. and Japan, 6 from 
France, 4 each from Canada and Singapore, 3 from the U.K., and 2 each from Australia, China, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland.16 
 Our database includes information on the asset and liability holdings and income and 
expense information of Korean and foreign banks. Before performing more rigorous analysis of 
the database, we first provide an overview discussion of a number of key variables related to 
bank performance over the 1994 to 1999 period. 
 Table 1 lists the average returns on assets and equity for foreign, nationwide, and 
regional banks. The foreign banks consistently experience higher average returns on assets and 
equity, consistent with half of the conundrum noted by Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001). Moreover, foreign banks average returns remain positive through the Asian financial 
crisis, unlike Korean banks – nationwide and regional. Regional banks first lead nationwide 
banks in average returns on assets and equity while returns remain positive. Once returns flip 
negative, regional banks sustain a larger hit in 1998 and become more negative than nationwide 
 
16 The following countries each had one bank represented – Germany, Hong Kong, India, Jordan, and Pakistan. 
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banks. Regional banks recover more quickly than nationwide banks and exhibit higher returns, 
although still negative, than nationwide banks in 1999. 
 Table 2 enumerates the number of foreign, nationwide, and regional banks over the 
sample period. Foreign banks outnumber Korean banks – nationwide plus regional – by about 2 
to 1. Bank closures in 1998 and 1999, however, push this ratio to nearly 2.5 to 1. Japanese and 
U.S. banks surpass by a large margin the presence of banks from other countries. In 1994, 14 
Japanese banks operated in Korea. As just noted, this number falls to 7 by 1999 with all but one 
of the exits occurring after the Asian financial crisis. In 1994, 11 U.S. banks operated in Korea. 
After 3 entrances and 3 exits, 11 U.S. banks remain in business in 1999. France and Singapore 
each held steady with 6 and 4 banks, respectively, in all sample years. 
 Superiority in numbers does not translate into dominance in the markets, since Korean 
banks uniformly exceed, on average, the foreign banks in asset size. Table 3 reports the average 
assets held by foreign, nationwide, and regional banks. Nationwide banks possess about 4 times 
the assets of regional banks and about 35 times the assets of foreign banks. Those ratios rise to 
about 6 and 45 by 1999. Foreign banks achieved the highest average size in assets in 1998. The 
top 15 foreign banks in 1998 in asset size include 2 U.S. banks, 5 Japanese banks, 4 French 
banks, and one bank each from Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
 Table 3 also suggests that Korean banks did respond to the shocks from the Asian 
financial crisis to the extent that they could. In general, loans decreased as a percent of assets in 
both 1998 and 1999 as banks tried to reduce the income risk that they faced. Moreover, deposits 
increased as a percent of assets in 1998 and 1999 as banks tried to reduce the expense risk that 
they faced. 
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 Researchers suggest that foreign lending to domestic banks played an important role in 
the Asian financial crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998, Cho and Hong 2001, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
2001, and Tornell 2001). That is, the Asian crisis precipitated a loss of foreign-source liabilities, 
exerting strong pressure on those banks with an illiquid asset base. If accurate, then we expect to 
see retrenchment in bank portfolios – declining assets and/or deposits. We do not observe such 
movements by in large for the Korean or foreign banks.  
 Total assets climbed continually from 1994 through 1999 for Korean nationwide and 
regional banks, and fell only slightly in 1999 for foreign banks (see Table 3). Deposits also rose 
steadily over the entire 1994 to 1999 period (see Table 4). In short, the consolidated balance 
sheet information does not provide much ammunition for the hypothesis that the withdrawal of 
foreign-source liabilities played a significant role in the Korean economic woes after the Asian 
financial crisis. If foreign-source liabilities were withdrawn from Korean nationwide banks, then 
such loses were more than replaced from domestic sources. 
 To offer a related insight to that last observation, Tables 4 and 5 also report information 
on foreign-currency deposits and foreign-currency loans, respectively. Both items, measured in 
Won, decrease after the Asian financial crisis in absolute terms (not shown) and as a percent of 
loans and discounts and deposits, respectively. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the lost 
loans and deposits were domestic or foreign residents, since that data are not available. 
 The holding of foreign-currency loans and foreign-currency deposits do expose banks to 
foreign exchange risk as long as foreign-currency loans exceed, or fall short of, foreign-currency 
deposits. For example, if foreign-currency loans exceed foreign-currency deposits, then a 
weakening Won increases the Won value of foreign-currency loans more than deposits, adding 
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to the equity base. Of course, a strengthening Won squeezes the equity base.17 We note that 
foreign-currency loans and deposits rise and fall together with those loans exceeding deposits in 
every year except 1997 for only nationwide banks (not shown). 
 Finally, Tables 4 and 5 also offer some evidence on the effects, if any, of foreign-
currency deposits and foreign-currency loans on bank performance. Nationwide banks rely more 
heavily on foreign-currency deposits and foreign-currency loans than regional banks.18 Both 
nationwide and regional banks did reduce their dependency on foreign-currency deposits and 
foreign-currency loans in 1999. Regional bank performance exceeded nationwide bank 
performance over 1994 to 1996, deteriorated more significantly during the 1997 and 1998 
period, and then recovered more briskly in 1999. In addition, foreign banks by 1999 relied more 
heavily on both foreign-currency deposits and foreign-currency loans than Korean nationwide or 
regional banks. Also, foreign bank performance dominated Korean nationwide and regional 
banks throughout the sample period. Thus, it is improbable that the holding of foreign currency 
deposits or foreign currency loans per se systematically contributed to poor bank performance 
across all bank types. If that were the case, then Korean regional bank performance should not 
have suffered so significantly and foreign bank performance should have suffered more severely. 
IV. Explaining Bank Performance in Korea 
Our data sample includes all nationwide and regional banks and all foreign banks in operation in 
any year from 1994 to 1999. Since some banks entered and/or exited over the sample period, we 
have an unbalanced panel data set of 441 observations – a panel of 510 observations with 69 
 
17 The database does not provide the breakdown of foreign-currency loans and deposits into individual currencies.  
18 Negotiable certificates of deposit include both won- and foreign currency-denominated accounts. Total loans and 
discounts do not equal the sum of won- and foreign-currency-denominated loans, since total loans and discounts 
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missing values. As noted above, the data include balance sheet and income statement data on 
these banks. In addition, we collected some macroeconomic information that change over time, 
but do not differ between banks at a point in time. 
 Our econometric analysis considers possible correlations between the balance sheet and 
income statement data as well as the macroeconomic data and our measures of bank performance 
returns on assets and equity. We produce two sets of regressions for the foreign, nationwide, and 
regional banks. In each set, the first regression considers three different types of individual bank 
explanatory variables: (1) portfolio distribution variables – won loans to assets, foreign currency 
loans to assets, won deposits to assets, negotiable certificates of deposit to assets, foreign 
currency deposits to assets, and equity to assets; (2) a risk variable – provision for loan losses to 
loans; and (3) a scale variable – total assets. The second regression broadens the analysis to 
include macroeconomic variables -- the unemployment rate, the rate of growth of real gross 
domestic product, the rate of depreciation of the Won, the fiscal budget surplus as a fraction of 
nominal gross domestic product, and the rate of inflation in the consumer price index. 
 We anticipate that interest-earning assets – Won loans to assets and foreign currency 
loans to assets --- will garner positive effects on bank profitability while interest-earning 
liabilities – Won deposits to assets, negotiable certificates of deposits to assets, and foreign 
currency deposits to assets – will garner negative effects. We expect that equity to assets will 
possess a positive effect, which reflects complementary factors. Higher equity to assets implies 
lower interest earning liabilities to assets. So net income, which includes any dividend payments, 
should increase as equity to assets rises, other things constant. Higher equity to assets also may 
 
include domestic import usance bills and advances to customers. 
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imply a well-run bank operation with fewer problems. And a well-run bank may imply higher 
net income. We foresee a negative effect of our risk variable, provision for loan losses to loans, 
on bank performance. Since we predict that poor macroeconomic performance will lead to poor 
bank performance, then negative effects on bank performance should associate with higher 
unemployment, a faster depreciation in the exchange rate, and a higher inflation rate. Further, a 
higher growth rate of real gross domestic product should associate with better bank performance. 
Finally, we do not have prior expectations about the effects of bank size of a higher fiscal surplus 
as a fraction of nominal gross domestic product on bank performance. 
 The standard method in empirical bank studies estimates regression equations with 
ordinary least squares (OLS), which assumes that the omitted variables are independent of the 
regressors and are independently, identically distributed. Such estimation, however, can create 
problems of interpretation if bank-specific characteristics, such as bank management, that affect 
performance are not considered. If those omitted bank-specific variables (both observed and 
unobserved) correlate with the explanatory variables, then OLS produces biased and inconsistent 
coefficient estimates (see Hsiao, 1986). Using panel data, however, the fixed-effect model 
produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients.19 
 The fixed-effect model assumes that differences across banks reflect parametric shifts in 
the regression equation. Such an interpretation becomes more appropriate when the problem at 
hand uses the whole population, rather than a sample from it. Since our sample considers all 
 
19 Another method of excluding unobserved country-specific variables estimates the first-differenced regression (see 
Hsiao 1986, and Westbrook and Tybout 1993). Also see Woolridge (2000, p. 447) for the choice between using 
fixed effects and first differences. Another popular method is the random-effects model, which assumes that 
individual specific constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. See Greene (2000, Ch. 14) 
for details. 
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domestic and foreign banks over a particular time period (i.e., 16 nationwide, 10 regional, and 59 
foreign banks), we adopt the fixed-effect model for our analysis. 
 Before reporting the results of our regression analysis, some background discussion on 
the sequence of events in our research will provide useful information. Jeon and Miller (2002) 
performed similar analysis on a richer data set for nationwide banks from 1991 to 1999.20 They 
found that including the 1999 data made the regression models less precise. Moreover, they 
discovered that Seoul appeared as an outlier. 
 Such large changes in results from adding data from 1999, with hindsight, seems a 
probable outcome, since the post-Asian-financial-crisis data are much noisier. The government’s 
hand in nationalization of several institutions and in recapitalizing many others likely altered 
normal relationships. A quick look at Table 1 suggests that amongst the nationwide banks, Seoul 
appears to have followed a different path in 1999. Seoul’s returns on assets and equity 
deteriorate further in 1999 when other banks experience some relief from the difficulties in 1998. 
Moreover, while the government finally did find a foreign purchaser for Korea First, Seoul 
remains at the altar awaiting a proper suitor. Jeon and Miller (2002) deleted the 1999 Seoul 
observation from their data set to improve the performance of the regression estimates. Thus, we 
also delete the 1999 Seoul observation, converting our data set to an unbalanced panel of 510 
with 70 missing values. And lastly, before examining our econometric results, we allow for 
differentiation between the effects of independent variables before and after the Asian financial 
crisis. To do so, we construct an Asian-financial-crisis dummy variable (equal zero for 1994 to 
 
20 The data provided on foreign banks required that we limit the variables considered in our econometric analysis. 
That is, the portfolio distribution and income and expense variables provide much less information in our current 
data set, although we are considering a much larger number of banks. 
  18
                                                
1996; one otherwise) and interact it with each independent variable. We drop all interaction 
terms for which the coefficients do not significantly differ from zero at the 20-percent level and 
re-estimate. 
 Table 6 and 7 report the regression results for the returns on assets and equity, 
respectively, excluding the 1999 Seoul observation and omitting the interaction terms with 
insignificant coefficients. Several observations deserve mention. First, F-tests determine whether 
foreign and domestic banks and then nationwide and regional banks experience different 
relationships. The foreign and domestic bank regressions differ significantly from each other at 
the 1-percent level in every case – returns on assets and equity both with and without 
macroeconomic controls. The nationwide and regional bank regressions also differ significantly 
from each other at the 1-percent level, except for the return on asset regressions without 
macroeconomic controls.21 In sum, we report separate regression results for nationwide, regional, 
and foreign banks. Within each bank subgroup, however, we employ panel data estimation, using 
the fixed-effect technique. 
 Second, the adjusted R2 for the regional-bank regressions suggest a reasonably good fit. 
The fit for the nationwide-bank regressions falls somewhat compared to the regional-bank 
regressions. The fit for the foreign-bank regressions leaves much unexplained variability.22 
Third, higher capital adequacy (equity to assets) associates positively with both the rates 
of return (return on assets and equity) for domestic (nationwide and regional) banks, but not for 
 
21 Here, the F-test is not significant even at the 20-percent level. 
22 The home-country variables for the foreign banks may explain movements in foreign bank performance. To 
pursue such issues goes beyond the intent of the current paper. Jeon, Natke, and Miller (2002) address those issues. 
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foreign banks.23 While that effect occurs for both the pre- and post-crisis periods for the return on 
assets specification, it only appears in general in the post-crisis period for the return on equity 
specification. What does that difference imply? When equity to assets increases, that may reflect 
higher equity, lower assets, of both. Thus, the return on assets more easily rises with an increase 
in equity to assets, than can return on equity. Nonetheless, we still find that positive correlation 
between return on equity and equity to assets during the post-crisis period, implying that the size 
of equity to assets provides a strong signal. Moreover, the positive effect of equity to assets on 
the returns on assets or equity for domestic banks emerges even as the government recapitalized 
several domestic banks and arranged for the merger of many others. That is, banks with 
significant financial problems receive an injection of new equity that should raise the equity to 
asset ratio. Such recapitalizations presumably impart a negative correlation. Thus, the highly 
significant and positive association between capital adequacy and rates of return must offset this 
government-induced negative association. 
Fourth, provisions for loan losses to total assets has a strong negative correlation with the 
returns on assets and equity across all three types of banks except for the regional banks in the 
rate of return on equity equations. The provision for loan losses crudely signals the riskiness of 
banks. Thus, higher loan loss provisions signal higher risk and associates negatively with bank 
returns. 
Fifth, the ratio of foreign-currency deposits to total assets displays a significantly 
negative effect on the returns on assets and equity for both nationwide and regional banks. For 
 
23 The fact that capital adequacy does not significantly affect foreign bank performance probably reflects the fact 
that the equity positions of foreign banks comprise a small part of the larger equity positions of the international 
banks to which they belong. 
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nationwide banks, that effect occurs in both the pre- and post-crisis periods; for regional banks, it 
occurs only in the post-crisis period. The foreign banks did not experience that significant effect. 
Jeon and Miller (2002) do not find that conclusion in their study of 16 nationwide banks. They 
considered a longer time period – 1991 to 1999. Differences in sample length may explain the 
difference in findings as to foreign currency deposits. That is, the Asian financial crisis began in 
mid-1997. As such, the sample from 1994 to 1999 has a larger percentage of sample years 
coming from after the crisis. Less influence is potentially wielded by the post-Asian financial 
crisis years in the 1991 to 1999 period. In additions, Jeon and Miller (2002) use end-of-year 
(last-quarter) data. Here, we employ quarterly averages. Thus, the well-known “window-
dressing” effect may explain the findings in Jeon and Miller (2002).24 
Sixth, the ratio of won-denominated loans to assets possesses a positive correlation with 
the rates of return on assets and equity for foreign banks, but not for domestic national banks. 
Moreover, that effect seems isolated to the post-crisis period. Nationwide banks possess a 
positive correlation between foreign currency loans and the rates of return on assets and equity. 
Regional banks possess a significant positive correlation only for the return on equity. 
Finally, the macroeconomic variables exert the most effect on the foreign and regional 
banks and the least effect on the nationwide banks. A rising unemployment rate and an increase 
in surplus to GDP ratio each associate with a lower rate of return on assets and equity for 
regional banks, but not for nationwide or foreign banks. The inflation rate and exchange rate 
depreciation negatively affect the rates of return on assets and equity for foreign banks, but 
generally do not affect the rates of return on assets and equity for domestic banks. 
 
24 “Window dressing” refers to the accounting “tricks” used at the close of the year to make an institution’s 
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In sum, the empirical results accord with our prior expectations with a few exceptions. 
All significant financial and macroeconomic variables possess the anticipated correlation with 
bank performance for Korean banks. A few more unexpected significant correlations emerge in 
the foreign bank regressions. Moreover, unexpected negative effects of foreign currency loans to 
assets, equity to assets, and inflation on bank performance appears in the foreign bank 
regressions as well as an unexpected positive effect of the unemployment rate. 
V. Conclusion 
The Asian financial crisis is but one of several recent crises that hit the world’s economies. 
Analysts suggest that it differs from prior crises in the importance of foreign lending. That is, 
recent capital flows into many Asian countries in response to the Asian miracle quickly exited 
once the crisis emerged. The sharp loss of lending quickly plunged financial institutions and 
corporations into a liquidity crisis. In addition, some analysts (e.g., Radelet and Sachs 1998, and 
Noland (2000) cite the initial IMF rescue programs that required credit tightening as contributing 
to the severity of the problems. The problems in Korea mirrored many of the problems 
confronted by other countries. The financial institutions needed recapitalization and 
restructuring. Furthermore, a number of important chaebols faced imminent default on their 
obligations. 
 If the exodus of capital precipitated a liquidity crisis in Korean banking, the data should 
reveal dramatic retrenchment in assets and deposits. We find no such evidence. Thus, although 
the data do not allow us to disentangle foreign-owned assets and liabilities from their domestic 
counterparts, any loss of foreign-owned liabilities that may have occurred was more than offset 
 
performance appear better than it actually is. 
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by an expansion in domestically owned liabilities, since total assets continued to increase before, 
during, and after the Asian financial crisis. 
 This also paper considers the performance of banks in Korea – nationwide, regional, and 
foreign -- before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis that is dated in July 
1997. The two largest banks – Korea First and Seoul – were judged as “too-big-to-fail.” The 
government sought foreign buyers for those banks. It took nearly two years to reach agreement 
with Newbridge Capital to acquire Korea First. As of this writing, Seoul was still on the auction 
block. Government assistance was given to a number of banks to facilitate an acquisition by 
other Korean banks. 
 The performance of Korean banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks recovered 
somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. The foreign 
banks did not experience the same negative effect on their returns on assets and equity as a rule.
 Several other factors also possess a strong correlation with bank performance as 
measured by the returns on assets and equity. Equity to assets correlates positively with 
domestic, but not foreign, bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number 
of institutions that performed quite badly. Decreases in foreign-currency deposits associate 
significantly and negatively with domestic Korean bank performance. Provisions for loan losses 
generally correlates negatively with bank performance as one expects. 
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 In sum, the Korean economy and financial sector has so far weathered a huge financial 
storm. But the oceans are not yet safe; the storm continues. Much progress has occurred in 
restructuring the financial sector. Less progress has occurred in the restructuring of the chaebols. 
This story has not yet seen its last chapter.  
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Table 1: Average Rates of Return on Assets and Equity (percentage) 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 ROA 
Foreign Banks 1.23 1.39 1.56 3.74 2.43 0.92 
Nationwide Banks 0.62 0.27 0.31 -1.03 -3.60 -1.89 
Regional Banks 0.81 0.55 0.40 -2.13 -7.53 -0.09 
 ROE 
Foreign Banks 6.67 9.25 9.74 23.02 18.97 7.96 
Nationwide Banks 5.45 3.01 3.66 -15.04 -55.80 -65.57 
Regional Banks 5.74 4.88 4.40 -20.51 -175.45 -1.61 
  
Note: See Appendix for bank names and country of origin. 
 
 
Table 2: Number of Foreign, Nationwide, and Regional Banks 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Number of Banks 
Foreign Banks 52 52 49 53 51 46 
Nationwide Banks 14 15 15 16 13 11 
Regional Banks 10 10 10 10 8 6 
  
Note: See Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3: Average Total Assets, Deposits, and Loans and Discounts 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Assets (millions of Won) 
Foreign Banks 2847 3659 4637 6142 7967 7693 
Nationwide Banks 103361 129683 154244 204071 275763 350231 
Regional Banks 24793 31054 37840 44331 47603 60727 
 Deposits (% of assets) 
Foreign Banks 11.8 9.2 7.9 8.2 12.3 16.3 
Nationwide Banks 57.7 60.2 59.5 58.0 60.7 63.6 
Regional Banks 69.2 67.2 64.8 61.7 61.3 71.4 
 Loans and Discounts (% of assets) 
Foreign Banks 34.4 28.2 27.2 25.8 23.9 22.0 
Nationwide Banks 57.3 56.5 55.7 57.9 50.7 48.6 
Regional Banks 56.0 54.3 52.3 53.0 49.7 45.3 
  
Note: See Table 1.  
 
  27
 
Table 4: Average Deposits and Their Distribution 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Deposits (million of Won) 
Foreign Banks 337 338 368 504 979 1255 
Nationwide Banks 59656 78065 91811 118318 167481 222852 
Regional Banks 17165 20861 24523 27358 29191 43382 
 Won Deposits (% of deposits) 
Foreign Banks 29.9 26.1 29.9 34.6 36.8 44.9 
Nationwide Banks 60.2 64.7 65.9 68.3 68.0 81.3 
Regional Banks 80.1 76.3 72.9 73.2 75.0 90.2 
 Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (% of deposits) 
Foreign Banks 60.6 66.5 62.6 53.6 36.7 33.3 
Nationwide Banks 13.5 13.8 12.1 8.3 5.0 3.9 
Regional Banks 15.1 18.1 21.1 20.2 16.1 6.3 
 Foreign Currency Deposits (% of deposits) 
Foreign Banks 10.1 7.5 7.4 11.8 26.6 21.8 
Nationwide Banks 26.3 21.5 21.9 23.4 27.0 14.9 
Regional Banks 4.9 5.6 5.9 6.6 8.9 3.5 
  
Note: See Table 1. 
 
 
Table 5: Average Loans and Discounts And Their Distribution 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Loans and Discounts (million of Won) 
Foreign Banks 979 1031 1262 1585 1906 1694 
Nationwide Banks 59226 73208 86872 118059 139836 170226 
Regional Banks 13890 16871 19801 23490 23668 27496 
 Won Loans (% of loans and discounts) 
Foreign Banks 68.0 66.6 57.1 47.4 45.2 55.0 
Nationwide Banks 67.8 69.6 66.9 65.6 70.1 77.9 
Regional Banks 95.5 94.6 93.7 92.8 88.2 94.3 
 Foreign Currency Loans (% of loans and discounts) 
Foreign Banks 27.1 27.1 36.5 47.0 51.0 39.6 
Nationwide Banks 29.5 28.3 31.0 32.3 27.5 19.8 
Regional Banks 3.0 3.9 4.6 5.3 7.0 4.3 
  
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 6: Panel Regressions of Return on Assets: 1994-1999 
Variable ROA 
 Foreign Nationwide Regional 
WL/A -0.0150 
(-0.44) 
0.0523
(1.37)
-0.0441
(-0.59)
-0.0615
(-0.86)
0.0755 
(0.60) 
0.0855
(1.18)
D*WL/A 
 
0.1177* 
(2.89) 
0.0837**
(2.09)
 
FCL/A -0.0048 
(-0.17) 
-0.0553‡
(-1.86)
0.1625**
(2.38)
0.1512‡
(1.93)
-0.0362 
(-0.06) 
-0.0449
(-0.14)
E/A -0.0012 
(-0.06) 
-0.0098
(-0.55)
0.3463*
(2.96)
0.1580
(1.15)
0.3191* 
(3.50) 
0.2593*
(3.67)
D*E/A 
 
  
PLL/A -0.6030* 
(-3.38) 
-0.5149*
(-2.88)
-0.0193
(-0.0528)
0.2496
(0.58)
-1.2800* 
(-4.68) 
-1.4269*
(-3.72)
D*PLL/A 
 
 -0.6059
(-1.55)
-0.8661**
(-2.06)
 0.7555‡
(1.97)
A 0.0021 
(0.49) 
-0.0055
(-1.27)
-0.0003
(-1.24)
0.0000
(0.05)
-0.0024 
(-0.65) 
-0.0024
(-0.86)
WD/A -0.0850 
(-0.67) 
0.0416
(0.33)
0.0403
(0.72)
0.0333
(0.56)
-0.1178 
(-1.44) 
-0.1303**
(-2.32)
D*WD/A 
 
  
CD/A -0.0629 
(-1.14) 
-0.0411
(-0.78)
0.0715
(0.88)
0.0293
(0.37)
-0.2511** 
(-2.07) 
-0.2281*
(-3.54)
FCD/A 0.1012 
(1.00) 
0.1155
(1.19)
-0.4246*
(-6.40)
-0.3412*
(-4.63)
0.0981 
(0.22) 
0.1621
(0.64)
D*FCD/A 
 
 -1.8769* 
(-3.76) 
-0.5344
(-1.58)
UNEM  0.9283
(1.49)
-0.7440
(-1.28)
 -1.2016‡
(-1.86)
DGDP  0.2683
(0.95)
00815
(0.31)
 0.4802‡
(1.99)
DEXCH  -0.1987*
(-2.96)
0.0612
(0.99)
 -0.0473
(-0.77)
SUR  0.9607
(0.89)
-0.8987
(-0.94)
 -1.9619‡
(-1.93)
INF  -0.7359**
(-2.08)
0.6604‡
(1.96)
 0.0538
(0.15)
Adjusted R2 0.0711 0.1861 0.6554 0.6981 0.7398 0.9307
SEE 0.0276 0.0249 0.0125 0.0117 0.0171 0.0088
Note: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA) as a fraction. Independent 
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individual bank variables include won-denominated loans to assets (WL/A), foreign 
currency loans to assets (FCL/A), equity to assets (E/A), provisions for loan losses to 
assets (PLL/A), assets (A, in billions of won), won-denominated deposits to assets 
(WD/A), certificates of deposit to assets (CD/A), and foreign currency deposits to assets 
(FCD/A). Independent macroeconomic variables include the unemployment rate 
(UNEM) as a fraction, the rate of growth of real GDP (DGDP) as a fraction, the rate of 
change in the Won per US dollar exchange rate (DEXCH) as a fraction, the government 
budget surplus to nominal gross domestic product (SUR), and the rate of inflation in the 
consumer price index (INF) as a fraction. Finally, D is the Asian financial crisis dummy 
variable (equals zero from 1994 to 1996; one otherwise). Summary statistics include the 
adjusted R2 and the standard error of the regression (SEE). Numbers in parentheses under 
coefficient estimates are t-statistics. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
‡ means significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level 
‡‡ means significantly different from zero at the 20-percent level 
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Table 7: Panel Regressions of Return on Equity: 1994-1999 
Variable ROE 
 Foreign Nationwide Regional 
WL/A -0.1988 
(-1.07) 
0.3264**
(2.08)
0.9660
(0.61)
-1.0809
(-0.88)
6.4047‡ 
(1.72) 
7.9386**
(2.28)
D*WL/A 
 
0.4087‡ 
(1.85) 
-3.0081‡
(-1.74)
 
FCL/A -0.0208 
(-0.14) 
-0.2997**
(-1.96)
3.2046*
(2.72)
2.2202
(1.65)
-15.2288 
(-0.93) 
-5.9433
(-0.39)
E/A -0.0838 
(-0.89) 
-0.1501
(-1.63)
3.0559
(1.23)
3.6925
(1.57)
-1.3906 
(-0.30) 
5.7026
(1.15)
D*E/A 
 
 6.5000‡
(1.79)
15.6920* 
(2.88) 
10.6105**
(2.12)
PLL/A -9.1705* 
(-5.25) 
-8.2430*
(-5.41)
-8.3901*
(-2.95)
3.6082
(0.49)
-67.6646* 
(-3.17) 
-60.7605*
(-2.77)
D*PLL/A 
 
4.7305** 
(2.30) 
5.2592*
(2.67)
-12.7275‡
(-1.76)
82.2019* 
(3.53) 
80.1891*
(3.57)
A 0.0748* 
(3.40) 
0.0376‡
(1.69)
-0.0042
(-0.88)
0.0009
(0.14)
0.1099 
(1.03) 
-0.0986
(-0.74)
WD/A 0.5799 
(0.58) 
-0.4385
(-0.69)
0.8379
(0.88)
0.3661
(0.36)
-2.4612 
(-0.98) 
5.8787
(1.31)
D*WD/A 
 
-2.3267‡ 
(-1.80) 
 -12.1790**
(-2.27)
CD/A -0.1370 
(-0.48) 
-0.0245
(-0.09)
0.5417
(0.40)
-0.3733
(-0.27)
-7.5209** 
(-2.11) 
-7.3239**
(-2.42)
FCD/A -0.2239 
(-0.52) 
-0.2036
(-0.41)
-6.2501*
(-5.70)
-4.4065*
(-3.47)
12.0958 
(0.87) 
5.8084
(0.48)
D*FCD/A 
 
 -58.4154* 
(-3.63) 
-38.8472**
(-2.37)
UNEM  7.2613**
(2.31)
-12.6696
(-1.26)
 -103.3952**
(-2.22)
DGDP  1.2614
(0.87)
0.1060
(0.02)
 -1.5374
(-0.13)
DEXCH  -1.0163*
(-2.94)
1.0892
(1.03)
 -0.0433
(-0.01)
SUR  8.1054
(1.48)
-12.4824
(-0.76)
 -148.7384**
(-2.15)
INF  -4.0207**
(-2.21)
7.5334
(1.30)
 -17.9635
(-1.04)
Adjusted R2 0.1896 0.2971 0.5903 0.6199 0.7277 0.8133
SEE 0.1371 0.1277 0.2093 0.2016 0.4994 0.4136
Note: See Table 6. The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE) as a fraction.  
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Appendix: 
 The banks included in this study were in operation in Korea at some point during 1994 to 
1999 and are subdivided into nationwide and regional Korean banks and foreign banks. Table A 
lists the banks, their country of origin, and the number of years in the sample. 
Table A: The Banks and Country of Origin 
Foreign Banks 
 Country Bank Name Sample Period 
1 United States CitiBank 1994-1999 
2 United States Bank of America 1994-1999 
3 United States First National Chicago 1994-1999 
4 United States American Express Bank 1994-1999 
5 United States Chemical 1994-1999 
6 United States Chase Manhattan 1994-1995 
7 United States Banker Trust  1994-1998 
8 United States Bank Boston 1994-1999 
9 United States The Union Bank of California 1994-1999 
10 United States Bank of New York 1994-1999 
11 United States Bank of Hawaii 1994-1999 
12 United States Nations Bank 1997-1998 
13 United States First Union National 1997-1999 
14 United States Morgan Guaranty Trust Co  1998-1999 
15 Japan Bank of Tokyo  1994-1995 
16 Japan Bank of Tokyo Mitsubi 1994-1999 
17 Japan Fuji Bank 1994-1999 
18 Japan DaiIchiKankyo 1994-1999 
19 Japan Sumitomo Bank 1994-1999 
20 Japan Sanwa Bank 1994-1999 
21 Japan ToOhKai 1994-1998 
22 Japan SaKura 1994-1998 
23 Japan Asahi Bank 1994-1999 
24 Japan Taiwa 1994-1998 
25 Japan Mitsubisu Trust 1994-1998 
26 Japan Yamakuchi 1994-1999 
27 Japan Japan Long-Term Trust 1994-1997 
28 Japan Yasda Trust 1994-1997 
29 France Credit Agricole Indosuez 1994-1999 
30 France Banque Nationale de Paris 1994-1999 
31 France Banque Paribas 1994-1999 
32 France Credit Lyonnais 1994-1999 
33 France YoBafe 1994-1999 
34 France Societe Generale 1994-1999 
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Foreign Banks (continued) 
 Country Bank Name Sample Period 
35 United Kingdom Standard Chartered Bank 1994-1999 
36 United Kingdom Barclays 1994-1995 
37 United Kingdom National Westminster 1994-1997 
38 Canada Bank of Nova Scotia 1994-1999 
39 Canada Montreal  1994-1996 
40 Canada Canada Royal  1994-1999 
41 Canada National Bank of Canada 1994-1999 
42 Singapore Singapore  1994-1999 
43 Singapore Development Bank of Singapore 1994-1999 
44 Singapore United Overseas Bank 1994-1999 
45 Singapore Overseas Union Bank 1994-1999 
46 Australia Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 1994-1999 
47 Australia National Australia Bank Limited 1994-1999 
48 Netherlands ABN-AMRO Bank 1994-1999 
49 Netherlands ING Bank NV 1994-1999 
50 Germany Deutsche Bank 1994-1999 
51 India Indian Overseas Bank 1994-1999 
52 Hong Kong Hong Kong-Shanghai 1994-1999 
53 Pakistan National Bank of Pakistan 1994-1999 
54 Jordan Arab Bank PLC 1994-1999 
55 China Bank of China 1994-1999 
56 China Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 1997-1999 
57 Philippines Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 1997-1999 
58 Switzerland Credit Suisse First Boston 1997-1999 
59 Switzerland UBS 1999-1999 
 
Korean Nationwide Banks 
 Country Bank Name Sample Period 
1 Korea Cho Hung 1994-1999 
2 Korea Sang-Up 1994-1999 
3 Korea Korea First 1994-1999 
4 Korea Hanil 1994-1998 
5 Korea Seoul 1994-1999 
6 Korea Korea Exchange 1994-1999 
7 Korea Kook-Min 1995-1999 
8 Korea Housing &Commercial 1997-1999 
9 Korea Shinhan 1994-1999 
10 Korea Han Mi (KORAM) 1994-1999 
11 Korea Dong-Wha 1994-1997 
12 Korea Dong-Nam 1994-1997 
13 Korea Dae-Dong 1994-1997 
14 Korea Hana 1994-1999 
15 Korea Boram 1994-1998 
16 Korea Pyong-Wha (peace bank of Korea) 1994-1999 
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Korean Regional Banks 
 Country Bank Name Sample Period 
1 Korea Daegu 1994-1999 
2 Korea Pusan 1994-1999 
3 Korea Chung-Cheong 1994-1997 
4 Korea Kwang-Ju 1994-1999 
5 Korea Che-Ju 1994-1999 
6 Korea Kyung-Gi 1994-1997 
7 Korea Jeon-Buk 1994-1999 
8 Korea Kong Won 1994-1998 
9 Korea Kyong-Nam 1994-1999 
10 Korea Chung Buk 1994-1998 
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Table 6o: Panel Regressions of Return on Assets: 1994-1999 
Variable 
 
ROA 
 Foreign Nationwide Regional 
WL/A 0.0476‡ 
(1.79) 
0.0999*
(3.24)
-0.0333
(-0.44)
-0.0432
(-0.59)
0.1190 
(0.81) 
0.1024‡‡
(1.37)
FCL/A -0.0055 
(-0.19) 
-0.0564‡
(-1.88)
0.1523**
(2.21)
0.1640**
(2.04)
-0.1379 
(-0.21) 
-0.0780
(-0.25)
E/A -0.0016 
(-0.09) 
-0.0100
(-0.55)
0.3313*
(2.81)
0.1021
(0.74)
0.3349* 
(3.15) 
0.2758*
(3.79)
PLL/A -0.6103* 
(-3.37) 
-0.5080*
(-2.82)
-0.5549*
(-3.28)
-0.5576*
(-3.17)
-1.0599* 
(-3.39) 
-0.6999*
(-4.21)
A 0.0025 
(0.58) 
-0.0058‡‡
(-1.33)
-0.0003
(-1.14)
0.0000
(0.02)
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
-0.0011
(-0.37)
WD/A -0.1145 
(-0.89) 
0.0390
(0.31)
0.0273
(0.49)
0.0146
(0.24)
-0.0317 
(-0.35) 
-0.0931‡‡
(-1.68)
CD/A -0.0680 
(-1.21) 
-0.0429
(-0.81)
0.0512
(0.63)
0.0142
(0.17)
-0.1979‡‡ 
(-1.41) 
-0.2160*
(-3.23)
FCD/A 0.0904 
(0.88) 
0.1181
(1.21)
-0.4394*
(-6.62)
-0.3740*
(-5.05)
-0.8593** 
(-2.07) 
-0.1294
(-0.61)
UNEM  0.7045
(1.14)
-0.3122
(-0.56)
 -1.7386*
(-2.81)
DGDP  0.2482
(0.87)
0.2118
(0.80)
 0.5260**
(2.10)
DEXCH  -0.2031*
(-3.00)
0.0339
(0.55)
 -0.0542
(-0.86)
SUR  0.7299
(0.68)
-0.6131
(-0.63)
 -2.6178**
(-2.62)
INF  -0.7893**
(-2.22)
0.7429**
(2.16)
 0.2034
(0.56)
Adjusted 
R2 
0.0422 0.1743 0.6472 0.6800 0.6449 0.9245
SEE 0.0270 0.0251 0.0127 0.0121 0.0199 0.0092
Note: The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA) as a fraction. Independent 
individual bank variables include won-denominated loans to assets (WL/A), foreign 
currency loans to assets (FCL/A), equity to assets (E/A), provisions for loan losses to 
assets (PLL/A), assets (A, in billions of won), won-denominated deposits to assets 
(WD/A), certificates of deposit to assets (CD/A), and foreign currency deposits to assets 
(FCD/A). Independent macroeconomic variables include the unemployment rate 
(UNEM) as a fraction, the rate of growth of real GDP (DGDP) as a fraction, the rate of 
change in the Won per US dollar exchange rate (DEXCH) as a fraction, the government 
budget surplus to nominal gross domestic product (SUR), and the rate of inflation in the 
consumer price index (INF) as a fraction. Summary statistics include the adjusted R2 and 
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the standard error of the regression (SEE). Numbers in parentheses under coefficient 
estimates are t-statistics. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
‡ means significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level 
‡‡ means significantly different from zero at the 20-percent level 
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Table 7o: Panel Regressions of Return on Equity: 1994-1999 
Variable 
 
ROE 
 Foreign Nationwide Regional 
WL/A 0.0582 
(0.43) 
0.3397**
(2.14)
-0.5238
(-0.41)
-0.8117
(-0.65)
5.8239 
(1.24) 
6.7288‡‡
(1.59)
FCL/A -0.0308 
(-0.20) 
-0.3131**
(-2.02)
2.6497**
(2.30)
2.4088‡
(1.76)
-15.4080 
(-0.73) 
-14.8777
(-0.83)
E/A -0.0795 
(-0.84) 
-0.1375‡‡
(-1.47)
5.9484*
(3.01)
2.8609
(1.22)
11.6522* 
(3.40) 
14.8876*
(3.63)
PLL/A -5.7875* 
(-6.21) 
-5.2829*
(-5.68)
-9.0958*
(-3.21)
-8.2521*
(-2.75)
8.5090 
(0.84) 
15.5917‡‡
(1.66)
A 0.0753* 
(3.41) 
0.0332‡‡
(1.47)
-0.0035
(-0.75)
0.0007
(0.11)
0.1571 
(1.17) 
0.0010
(0.01)
WD/A -1.0614‡‡ 
(-1.59) 
-0.4058
(-0.63)
0.4744
(0.50)
0.0910
(0.09)
-1.8413 
(-0.62) 
-1.1207
(-0.36)
CD/A -0.1675 
(-0.58) 
-0.0330
(-0.12)
0.2185
(0.16)
-0.5954
(-0.43)
-4.9077 
(-1.08) 
-5.8685‡‡
(-1.56)
FCD/A -0.2346 
(-0.44) 
-0.2042
(-0.41)
-6.2189*
(-5.60)
-4.8895*
(-3.87)
-31.3187** 
(-2.34) 
-14.5412
(-1.22)
UNEM  6.9832**
(2.20)
-6.3185
(-0.66)
 -88.0117**
(-2.52)
DGDP  0.9494
(0.64)
2.0211
(0.45)
 9.7697
(0.69)
DEXCH  -0.9457*
(-2.71)
0.6880
(0.65)
 -3.1143
(-0.87)
SUR  8.2428‡‡
(1.48)
-8.2849
(-0.50)
 -128.4488**
(-2.28)
INF  -4.5418**
(-2.47)
8.7454‡‡
(1.49)
 -4.1863
(-0.20)
Adjusted 
R2 
0.1680 0.2785 0.5797 0.6052 0.5504 0.7057
SEE 0.1389 0.1293 0.2120 0.2055 0.6417 0.5192
Note: See Table 6. The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE) as a fraction.  
 
